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The Real Interest Rate: An Empirical Investigation
ABSTRACT
This paper is an empirical exploration of real interest rate movements
in the United States over the last fifty years. It focuses on several
questions which have repeatedly arisen in the literature. How valid is the
hypothesis that the real rate of interest is constant? Does the real rate
decline. with increases in expected inflation? Are cyclical movements in real
variables correlated with real rate movements? How reliable is the Fisher
effect where nominal interest rates reflect changes in expected inflation?
Does monetary policy affect the real return to saving, with the resulting non-
neutral effect on capital formation and productivity? What kind of variation
in real interest rates have we experienced in the last fifty years? Have
real rates turned negative in the 1970s as is commonly believed, and were they
unusually high in the initial stages of the Great Depression?
In pursuing these questions, this paper outlines the methodology and
theory used in the empirical analysis. The results indicate that contrary to
Fama's finding, there are significant movements in the real rate in both the
prewar and postwar period. In particular, there is a significant negative
correlation between inflation and the real interest rate, and real rates appear
to have been unusually high during the contraction phase of the Great Depression,
while unusually low in the high inflation 1970s. The results do not pick up
significant correlations between real interest rates and any of the real
variables tested. However, the failure to find these correlations is likely
to be the result of small cyclical variation of real rates rather than the
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Knowledge of how real interest rates move over time is critical to
our understanding of macroeconomics. Movements in the real rate are cen-
tral to the discussion of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in
the standard ISLM paradigm as well as in modern macroeconometric models.l
Monetary policy is viewed as affecting the real rate of interest which then
affects business and consumers' investment decisions and hence aggregate
demand. Real intere~t rates also play a prominent role in explanations of
business cycles and particular business cycle episodes. For example, the
apparently unusually high real rates in the early years of the Great De-
pression is frequently cited as a major factor in that business cycle down-
2 turn. The impact of real interest rates on savings-consumption decisions
3 \ -
has also been the subject of recent work. \If saving responds negatively to
\"
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the real return on saving, as some have claime~, then declines in the real
interest rate can have an adverse effect on capital formation and hence on
productivity, a serious concern of policymakers. Clearly, the real interest
rate deserves careful study.
This paper is an empirical exploration of real interest rate move-
ments in the United States over the last fifty years. It focuses on
several questions which have repeatedly arisen in the literature. How
valid is the hypothesis associated with Fama (1975) that the real rate of
interest is constant? Does the real rate decline with increased inflation?
Are cyclical movements in real variables correlated with real rate move-
ments? How reliable is the Fisher (1930) effect where nominal interest
rates reflect changes in expected inflation? What kind of variation
in real interest rates have we experienced in the last fifty years?
12
Have real rates turned negative in the 1970s as is commonly believed, and
were 'they unusually high in the initial stages of the Great Depression?
.
In pursuing these questions, this paper first outlines in section II
the methodology and theory used in the empirical analysis. The empirical
results then follow in Section III, and a final section contains the con-
eluding remarks.
II. THE METHODOLOGY
The real rate of interest for a one-period bond is defined from the
• Fisher (1930) equation
where,
it = the nominal interest rate earned on a one-period bond
maturing at time t--i.e., it is the nominal return from
holding the one-period bond from t-l to t.
e
~t = the rate of inflation fromt-l to t expected by tl1e bond
market at time t-l.
rr
t = the one-period real rate of interest expected by the bond
market at time t-l for the bond maturing at time t.
Hence, the real interest rate, rrt , is just the difference between the nominal
rate of interest and the expected rate of inflation:S it is the real return
from holding the one-period bond from t-l to t which is expected at time t-l.
Because the real rate is a return expected at the beginning of the period,
it is also frequently referred to as the ex ante real rate. This more3
precise terminology is used to differentiate it from what is termed the
ex post real rate: this is the actual real return from holding the one-
~
period bond from t-l to t. It equals the nominal interest rate minus the




t = the one-period ex post real rate for the bond maturing at time t,
n = the actual inflation rate from t-l to t.
t •
Note that the above equations do not allow for taxes. This issue is de-
ferred to a later section of the paper. Note also that for expositional con-
venience, the ex ante real rate is always referred to as the real rate
throughout this paper, while the ex post real rate always refers to the
variable defined in (2).
One approach to analyzing the movements in the real rate is to calculate
them by using a survey measure of inflation expectations, such as the Livingston
data, which is then subtracted from a nominal interest rate e The resulting
survey-based measure of the real rate can then be studied directly, for
6
example, by calculating its correlation with relevant variables. The problem
\lith this approach is that it is only as good as the survey measure of inflation
7 expectations, and there are serious doubts as to the quality of these data.
As a result, a different methodology is used in the analysis here which involves
correlation and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the ex post real
rate.
The underlying assumption behind this analysis is the rationality of
inflation expectations in the bond market, which implies the following
condition:4
Where,
't-l = information available at time t-l.
This tells us that the forecast error of inflation must be uncorrelated with
past available information. There is a large body of evidence that supports
this rationality, or equivalently the efficiency of financial markets.8
Furthermore, tests more specifically directed at the rationality of inflation
forecasts in the bond market also support the use of this assumption over
• 9
long sample periods such as are used here.
If the real rate determined at t-l, rrt , is correlated with variables,
Xt _l , which are elements of the available information set ~t-l' then we
can write,
Note that the error term, ut ' is also determined at t-l. Substituting (4) into
e (2) nnu vriting tile inflntion forecaot error, ~t - ~t' as £t we get:
where
Since data on the ex post real rate, eprrt , are observable, in contrast with
data on the real rate, equation (5) can be estimated. The question arises:"
what will be the relationship between OLS estimates from (5), with what
would be obtained from (4) if it wp.re estimable? To answer this question,
several propositions are demonstrated for the simplest case where the X-
variables are non-stochastic. With the appropriate assumptions,IO corresponding5
asymptotic results can be generated for the case of stochastic XiS, but this
additional complexity is avoided here•.
..
The first proposition is that the OLS estimates of Bfrom (4) and
(S) are equal in expectation for the non-stochastic X case (and with the
appropriate assumptionll they will be equal in the probability limit in the
h . ) 12 stoc ast1c X-case • Thisproposi~ion is derived as follows. Denote the
OLS estimate of Bin (4) as B and in (S) as B • Then rr eprr
(6)
and
E{B ) rr = E{{X'X)-lX' [xa + u]) = B + E[(X'X)-lx,u]
(7)
E{B ) rr
because the rationality of inflation expectations in (3) implies that
E(X'e) = O. Note that this proposition has been demonstrated without an
assumption on the properties of u. Thus it is valid even if B is a biased
rr
(or inconsistent) estimate of B.
Thus this result tells us that although we cannot observe the real
rate, rrt , we can infer information about its relationship to variables
known at time t-1 through OLS regressions with the ex post real rate. Note
tha~ any problems of inconsistency that might arise in an OLS estimate of
(4) because ut is correlated with Xt will also exist for the ex post real
rate regression. Thus without the knowledge that (4) is exogenous, we
cannot interpret OLS results as containing information on causation. They
can only provide information on movements in. the X-variables.6
We will also be concerned with the variance-covariance matrix of the
two estimates. Assume that we have a particulary well-behaved problem where
the OLS S-estimates are consistent and serial correlation of either the error
term in (4) or the composite error term in (5), ut - Et , is ruled out by the
following, additional assumptions.13
(8) E(X'u) = 0 or equivalently E(-<1) = C
E(UtUt +s ) = 0 for all s




) = o for all t E
E(Ut+SEt ) = 0 for all s > 0
... ...
Then the variance-covariance matrices of S and Seprr are: rr
(9)
and
(10) E[(S - S) (S - S)'] eprr eprr
1 -1 = E[(X'X)- x' (uu' + EE' - 2U'E)X(X'X) ]
Note that the derivation of (10) also makes use of the rationality implication
in (3) which requires that Et is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with
u's _dated at t and before.
A comparison of the two variance-covariance matrices above points out
the major difficulty with ex post real rate regressions. Although they
yield the same expected value of the coefficient estimates as an actual real
rate regression (if it were estimable), the variance-covariance matrix of the
2 -1 estimates will be larger by the term 0 (X'X) • Thus statistical tests will
E





Unfortunately, as has been pointed out by Nelson and Schwert (1977), the
forecast errors for inflation are probably extremely large and are muchgreater in magnitude than the u's.
7
2 -1 Because the term cr (XIX) will then be
E:
(11)
2 -1 much larger than cr (XIX) , estimates of" a from the ex post regressions will
u
be substantially more imprecise than if they were obtainable from an actual
real rate regression. In this case it may be very hard to discern significant
a-coefficients in the ex post real rate regressions because the statistical
tests will have so little power. Th~s is essentially the point made by Nelson
and Schwert in their comment on Fama (1975) .14
We can also use the estimated ex post real rate regressions to pro-
vide us with information on how the real rate has moved over time. The
fitted values from these regressions are an estimate of the real .rate and
are denoted as rr
t
: i.e.,
A = X B rrt t-l eprr
This estimate of the real rate has errors for two reasons. First, some
variables or nonlinearities which explain real rate movements are likely to
have been left out of the regression model, resulting in a non-zero ut term.
Second, the a-coefficient would be estimated with some error in a finite
sample. To see this, we just subtract equation (4) from (11) to yield the
error,
(12)
The variance of the within-sample error, is easily derived under the above
.. f 11 15,16
assumpt~ons as 0 ows:8
(13) VAR(rrt - rr
t




(x'x)-lX' (u - e) - u ) t t





(x'X)-lx'(u - e:)(u- e:) 'X(X'X)-lX' +
2
- 2u = ut t-l . t
(u.- e:)'X(X'X)-lX' ]
t-l
Because we do not know the exact relative size of the 0'2 and 0'2 which add
e: u
up to the overall variance of the composite error termu - e:, the formula in (13)
cannot be used directly to yield standard errors of r"rt - rrt • However upper
and lower bounds for these standard errors can be derived. If the term
xt _l (x'X)-lX~_l is less than one-half as is always the case in the results of
this paper, the lower bound for the standard error of rrt - rrt is reached when all
variation of the composite error term is due totally to the forecast error
f . fl . 17 o J.n atJ.on. with an estimate of the standard error of the ex post real
rate regression, a, this is the case where it is assumed that a = a and a = 0.':" e: u
The lower bound estimate of the standard error of ;rt -rrt , denoted as SE~(rrt -
'" The upper bound estimate of the standard error, SEu(r"rt - rrt ), is reached when all
variation of the composite error is due totally to variation in ut : i.e.,
a =aanda u e: = o.
,..
(15) SEu(rrt - rrt ) X ( .)-1 I t-l X X xt _l9
Because 0 2 is likely to greatly exceed 0 2 here, the lower bound estimate
€ u
is likely to be a far more accurate measure of the true standard error than the
..
upper bound estimate. Thus in the discussion of the empirical results later
in the paper, more attention will be devoted to the lower bound estimate.
However, the upper bound estimate will also be reported so that someone with
a different prior can use this information in deriving their estimates of the
.standard error.
This section has demonstrated that regressions with ex post real rates
have many desirable statistical properties. On the other hand, the potential
•
unreliability of survey measures of inflation expectations makes more direct
approaches to inference about real rates suspect. Therefore, even though
regressions, or equivalently correlations, with ex post real rates may have low
statistical power, they a~e a dependable way of inferring information about
real interest rates. This then is the method of analysis used in this paper.
However, the discussion above issues a warning for interpreting the results
that follow. The absence of a variable's significant explanatory power in an
ex post real rate regression should not be viewed as evidence that the real
rate is unrelated to this variable. An alternative, and equally plausible
view, is that the statistical tests here just do not have enough power to
find this relationship. with 'this caveat, we can now turn to the actual
empirical results in the next section.10
III. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
THE DATA
.
The empirical analysis here uses quarterly data on the ex post real
rate for three month treasury bills. These ex post rates are at a quarterly
rate and are calculated by subtracting the actual, continuously compounded
inflation rate (using the seasonally ~adjusted Consumer Price Index (CPI»
from the continuously compounded nominal yield on a three month bill maturing
at the end of the quarter. The bill rate data were obtained from the bond
file of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University
of Chicago.lS As in Fama (1975), the CPI is used to calculate inflation rates
here rather than the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) because only the CPI re-
fleets transaction prices. The dating convention is as follows. The ex post
real rate for a quarter is the actual real return on a three month bill held
from the beginning to the end of that quarter. All variables that are growth
rates, such as money growth, real GNP growth and inflation, are calculated
as the change in the log from the last month of the previous quarter to the
current quarter and are thus at quarterly rates. The une~ployment rate is
for the last month in the quarter and the investment to capital ratio is
constructed comparably to this ratio in Fama and Gibbons (1980) by dividing
the investment over the quarter by the capital stock at the end of the quarter.
The variables used in the analysis here are discussed in more detail in the
Data Appendix.
Monthly data are not used in the analysis for the following reason.
It is not clear what is the appropriate dating for the CPI in a particular
month since price quotations have been collected over the entire month. Thus
there is no accurate way of matching up the timing of the one month bills
with the dating of the CPl. This problem is somewhat less severe when quarterly11
data are used. The potential timing error of using the CPI in the last month
of the quarte~ as a match for a three month bill maturing at the end of the
quarter is smaller as a fraction of the time to maturity than would be the
case if the one month bill maturing at the end of the month is matched up,
as in Fama (1975), with the CPI in that month. The quarterly ex post real
rates should be more accurate than the one month rates as a result. Further-
more, Fama (1975) finds only small differences in coefficient estimates with
quarterly versus monthly data, and little additional information is contained
in the more noisy monthly series since the standard errors of the coefficients
using the monthly dat~ are only slightly smaller than those found with the
quarterly data.
The empirical analysis of this paper focuses its main attention on
the 1953-1 through 1979-4 sample period as an update to Fama (1975). The
1979-4 quarter was the latest quarter for which the CRSP bill series was
available. Fama started his analysis in 1953 as here because the CPI was
substantially upgraded in that year. He ended his sample period at the second
quarter of 1971 to avoid any possible distortions that the Nixon price controls
might have had on the measurement of the CPl. In preliminary results I ex-
eluded the price control period from 1971-3 to 1974-4 from my analysis with
little appreciable effect on the coefficient estimates or on the major
f " d" 19 ~n ~ngs. Since it is not Obvious that the Nixon price controls should
have·severely distorted the CPI, data from this period are included in the
analysis.
RESULTS: 1953-1 to 1979-4
Tests with ex post real rates in Fama (1975) could not reject the
hypothesis that the real rate was constant over the 1953-71 period. However,12
later work which frequently used more refined statistical tests did find
significant rejections of this hypothesis. Included in this work is not only
that of Fama's critics, Carlson (1977), Garbade and Wachtel (1978), Hess and
Bicksler (1975), Joines (1977) and Nelson and Schwert (1977), but also that
by Fama himself, Fama (197Gb) and Fama and Gibbons (1980). Extending Fama's
original sample period through the end of the 1970s should yield new insights
into the question of the constancy of the real rate because the 1971-3 to
1979-4 period has been one of unusual economic turbulence by postwar standards.
It contains both the worst recession in the postwar period as well as the .
highest inflation rates. The greater variation in the data that occurred as
a result could make statistical relationships that much more clear-cut.
The null hypothesis of the constancy of the real rate is studied here
with two types of tests which are similar to those carried out in Fama (1975).
First, we look at the serial correlation structure of the ex post real rate,
and we then turn to tests of whether other variables in the available infor-
mation set, ~t-l' are correlated with the ex post real rate. These tests
correspond to the weak form and strong form tests discussed in the efficient
I ' 20 markets ~terature.
Table 1 contains the first twelve autocorrelations of the ex post
real rate for the 1953-79 period. These autocorrelations are positive and
large, and more than half are more than two standard errors away from zero.
The constancy of the real rate implies the null hypothesis that all the
autocorr~lationsequal zero. It is formally tested with the adjusted Q-
statistic suggested by Ljung and Box (1978). The Q(12) statisti.c is dis-
2 tributed approximately as X (12), and its marginal significance level is the
probability of getting that value of the test statistic or higher under the
null hypothesis: i.e., a marginal significance level less than .01 indicatesTABLE 1
Serial Correlation Structure of the Ex Po8tReal Rate: 1953-1 to 1979-4
==;;;;;;;;0; ---...--- ---======-- -==========
Lag k
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Autocorrelation .38 .28 .36 .45 .31 .16 .24 .15 .20 .08 .24
at Lag k
(r_k)
Test of r 1=r2=,•••,=r12=0
Q(l2) = 102.33










NOTES: Q(12) is the adjusted Q-statistic suggested by Ljung and Box (1978) which is
12
distributed approximately as X2 (12) = n(n + 2) ~ (n - k)-lr~k' where n = number
k=l
of observations = 108.
Marginal significance level is the probability of setting that value of the Q-
statistic or higher under the null hypothesis that r l=r2=,•••,=r12=0.
Approximate standard error = l/!:n •13
a rejection of the null hypothesis at the one percent level. The rejection
of the n~ll'hypothesisis very strong. ~e Q(12) statistic exceeds 100 and
, .
its corre~ponding"tnargina1 significance level is extremely small. Thus,
despite the possible low power of this test discussed by Nelson and Schwert
(1977) and the previous section, the additional data added to Fama's (1975)
sample period now result in a clear-cut rejection of the constancy of the
real rate.
Table 2 contains tests for whether the ex post real rat~and hence
the real rate,has been correlated with other variables whose values were
known when the real rate was determined. Because heteroscedasticity can have
21 a major impact on results, Goldfe1d-Quandt (1965) as well as Glesjer (1969)
tests were performed in order to see if corrections for heteroscedasticity
were necessary. They uniformly did not reveal the presence of heteroscedas-
ticity for this sample period and so ordinary least squares was used in
. . 22
est~mat~on.
Considering the recurrent discussion of the Mundell-Tobin effect in
the literature, the inflation rate is an obvious candidate as a variable that
23 might be correlated with, the real rate. Model 2.1 tests for this correlation
and the results do exhibit a strong, significant negative correlation of the
ex post real rate with the lagged inflation rate: its coefficient of -.3073
has a t-statistic over six in absolute value with a very low marginal signi-
ficance level. This result rejecting the constancy of the real rate is con-
sistent with many other studies, such as Lahiri (1976), Carlson (1971), Levi
and Makin (1979) and Pearce (1979), which find a significant negative cor-
relation between the real rate and expected inflation.
Since this significant negative relationship between inflation and the
real rate is so striking and has such important implications, it deservesTABLE 2
Tests of the Constancy of the Real Rate: 1953-1 to1979~4
Dependent Variable: Ex Post Real Rate
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NOTES: T-statistics in parentheses.
SE = standard error of the regression.
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic.
Time = time trend = runs from .01 in 1947-1 to 1.32 in 1979-4, superscript of time variable
indicates raised to that power.
n(-I) = inflation rate at quarterly rate, lagged one quarter
F = F-statistic for null hypothesis that all the coefficients excluding the constant term are
zero: distributed as F(1,106) in 2.1, F(4,103) in 2.2 and F(5,102) in 2.3.
Marginal Significance level = probability of getting that value of F or higher under the null
hypothesis.
f.14
further scrutiny and testing for robustness. One question that arises asks:
Is this result dependent on the choice of the CPI as the price index in the
empirical analysis? The answer appears to be no. Despite the limitations
of the WPI because it is not constructed from transaction prices, it is a
plausible alternative to the CPI as a price index for use here. When model
2.1 is reestimated with the variables. constructed using the WPI rather than
CPI, the significant negative correlation of the ex post real rate and inflation
continues to hold up. The coefficient on the lagged inflation rate in this
WPI regression equals -.3040 and is almost identical to the corresponding
coefficient in Table 2. Its t-statistic is also highly significant, equaling
-4.41.
Another question of robustness wonders whether the negative relation-
ship of the real rate and.inflation is only consistent with data from the
last half of the sample period when inflation rates were high. This is a
particularly relevant question because Fama (1975) did not find a significant
negative correlation of the real rate and inflation using a sample period that
excluded data from the high inflation 1970s. To pursue this question, the
sample was split in half, and model 2.1 was estimated over both sample periods.
The lagged inflation coefficient in the regression for the first half of
the sample, 1953-1 to 1966-2, is not significantly negative: it equals -.0067
with a t-statistic of only -.05. Note, however, that the standard error
of this coefficient is quite large, exceeding .13. In the regression for the
last half of the sample, 1966-3 to 1979-4, the lagged inflation coefficient
is not far from the value of the corresponding coefficient in Table 2: it
equals -.3614 and is statistically significant with a t-statistic of -4.23.15
The discrepancy between these results could be occurring because, in the
early sample p'eriod,there just is not enough variation in the real rate to
discern an inflat:lon effect. A Chow test for the stability
of the coefficients of model 2.1 over these two sample periods confirms
this conjecture. The F(2,104) statistic equals 2.47 (its critical value
at the 5% level is 3.1) and does not reject the equality of the 2.1 coefficients
in the two periods. It appears that Fama's (1975) inability to find the sig-
nificant correlation of inflation with the ex post real rate was due to the
peculiar nature of his particular sample period which, as noted by Shiller
(1980), has insuffici~ntvariation in the real rate. The results here then show
that the postwar period is more accurately characterized as displaying a
negative correlation of the real rate and inflation.
Model 2.2 of Tabl~ 2 contains a more mechanical test of the constancy
of the real rate by postulating that the real rate moves with a fourth-order
polynomial in time. A fourth-order polynomial is used in the tests here be-
cause additional variables with higher powers of the time trend did not have
. .f· t dd·· 1 24. . f s~gn~ ~can a ~t~ona explanatory power. The reJect~on 0 the constancy
of the real rate is also strong in this case, with an extremely small mar-
ginal significance level for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on
the time trend variables equal zero. When the trend variables are added to
model 2.1, as in model 2.3, there is a significant improvement in explanatory
power: F(4,102) = 4.33 while the critical F at 5% is approximately 2.5. Here,
the marginal significance level that tests the null hypothesis of the con-
stancy of the real rate declines even further. 25
Table 3 tests whether other variables that have been cited in the
literature are correlated with the real rate. The one and four lags of these
variables are used in models which either include or exclude the lagged15a
TABLE 3
Tests for Correlation of Real Rate with Other Variables: 1953-1 to 1979-4
Dependent Variable: Ex Post Real Rate



















































































































.26 .0045 2.16 .08
NOTES: Data definitions are discussed in the Appendix.
T-statistics in parentheses.
F-statistic is distributed as F(4,l03) in odd numbered models and
F(4,102) in even-numbered models. The critical value of these
F-statistics at the 5% level is approximately 2.5.16
inflation variable. The most striking finding in this table is that none of
the real variables--real GNP growth, the GNP gap which is the percentage
difference between potential GNP and real GNP, the unemploy-
ment rate and the investment to capital ratio--have significant explanatory
power for movements in the ex post real rate.26 Including lagged inflation in
these regressions does not alter this finding. Table 3's lack of success in
finding significant correlations should not be viewed as implying that real
factors do not affect the real rate. More plausible is the view that the
statistical tests here do not have sufficient power to discern co-movements of
real variables and the real rate. Since the real variables used here are
meant to capture cyclical effects on the real rate, this ndght occur because
there just is not enough cyclical variation in the real rate to be picked up
27 by these tests.
The results with the money growth variable are more interesting. Results
with an M2 money growth measure are similar to those found for Ml in Table 3
28 and are thus not reported. When the lagged inflation rate is excluded from
the money growth regressions, the coefficients of the lagged money growth
variables are statistically significant and have a negative sum.29 Thus an
increase in money growth has the usual negative relationship with real rates
that we would expect from standard monetary theory. However, the 3.2 results
indicate that the negative correlation of money growth and the real rate may
only"arise because of the positive correlation of money growth with inflation:
the money growth coefficients are no longer significant when they are added
to an ex post real rate regression that includes the lagged inflation rate.
Feldstein (1980a) has argued that an increased rate of moner growth is non-
neutral because it raises inflation and lowers the real return to saving, and
this can have an adverse effect on capital formation and productivity. The
significant negative correlation of the real rate and money growth found herefrom (IS».
17
is in the direction that Feldstein's argument requires, but it can only be
taken as evid~nce supporting his position if we are willing to ascribe causation
.
to the results. Because the money growth variables do not have significant
explanatory power in addition to lagged inflation, the evidence for a short-
run cyclical effect of monetary policy is weak. Again, this might be attributed
to the low power of these statistical tests. But it does point out why it
might be so difficult to sort out the issue discussed by Shiller (1980) as to
th . 30 whether e Federal Reserve System can contrel real interest rates.
To briefly summarize the results in Tables 1-3: The real interest
rate has not been eo~stant over the 1953-79 period, and the economic variable
most highly correlated with the ex post real rate is the inflation rate. None
of the other economic variables add significant explanatory power to the ex
post real rate regressions with lagged inflation as an explanatory variable.
However, there is something left to explain in real rate movements because
time trend variables do add significant explanatory power.
Another approach to understanding these results involves looking at
estimates of the real rate derived from fitted values of the most interesting
of the regressions. Figure 1 contains the estimates of the real rate derived
from the fitted values of the regression with the best fit, #2.3. The inner
band surrounding the real rate estimates delimits the region where real rates
are within two lower-bound standard errors of the estimated real rate (as
calculated from (14». The outer band is the region where real rates are
within two upper-bound standard errors of the estimated real rate {as calculated
2 2 Because, as discussed previously, it is likely that a «a, the
u €
inner band is probably a reasonable characterization of the 95% confidence
interval, although it is necessarily an underestimate. Attention will primarily
be focused on this inner band when discussing inference in what follows. Yet,
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suitable caution.
Figure 1 indicates that the real'rate tended to be positive in the
first twenty years of the sample period, with a declining trend from 1953-56,
an upward trend reaching a maximum in the boom years of the mid-1960s and
a declining trend thereafter. Using the inner band for inference, the esti-
mated real rates were significantly p'ositive for most of this period and the
peak values of over two percent at an annual rate are more than six of the
lower-bound standard errors away from zero. The real interest rate appears
to turn negative towards the end of 1972 and the downward trend accelerates
•
through the end of 1974,whereupon the real rate stays negative but has no
easily discernible trend. Throughout most of the 1973-79 period, the esti-
mated real rates remain significantly negative according to the inner band
confidence region, and the most negative estimated real rates of approximately
minus two percent at an annual rate are more than five of the lower-bound
standard errors away from zero. Thus, as casual inspection of nominal interest
rate and inflation data might have led one to suspect, there is strong evidence
that real interest rates were positive in the 1950s and 60s, but have turned
quite negative in the mid- and late 1970s.
One striking feature of these results is their similarity to those
of Garbade and Wachtel (1978) and Fama and Gibbons (1980). They also use
ex post real rate data, but find their results with a very different statis-
·ticai technique involving variable-parameter regression. Both of these
studies assume that the real rate is so highly autocorrelated that its move-
ments over time can be approximated as a random walk. There is somewhat
more smoothness on their result1ng real rate estimates than is the case here,
but the overall magnitudes and peaks and troughs of the series are quite
th . . 1 31 close to ose 1n F1gure •
then lends further support to the results here.19
Because time trend variables do contain additional explanatory power
over the lagged inflation rate in the ex·post real rate regressions, there
must be some other economic variables left out of the analysis here that
help explain real rate movements and are correlated with the trend variables.
This leaves us with a puzzle to figure out what these excluded variables
might be. One clue comes from a comp~rison of the estimated real rates from
the model which only includes the lagged inflation rate as an explanatory vari-
able with those from the model which also includes the time trends as additional
explanatory variables. Figure 2 contains one series of estimated real rates
derived from the fitted values of model 2.1 while the other, which has already
appeared in Figure 1, is derived from model 2.3. The two series have a
roughly similar pattern, but a comparison indicates that the time trend
variables make the estimated real rate higher in the 1961-70 period, lower in
the 1975-79 period and lower in the 1954-57 period. We might search for rele-
vant economic variables missing from this analysis by noting that their effect
on the real rate should be in a similar direction.
The estimates of the real rate obtained with the approach used here
provide another piece of useful information. An estimate of the expected
inflation rate, ;~, is easily derived by subtracting the estimated real rate,
rrt , from the nominal interest rate, it: . 32
1.e.,
(16) . x 13 t-l eprr
This measure of expected inflation has several advantages over those generated from
univariate ARlMA time-series models or from surveys, the alternatives most
frequently used in the literature. The principal advantage of this measure
is that it is a more accurate predictor of inflation. For the prediction error
in this sample, the within-sample standard error of the measure derived fromFIGURE 2
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an ARIMA (0,1,1) mode133 with a seasonal MAl term is .0047 versus .0042 for
the measure derived from model 2.3.34 Since Pearce (1979) has shown that a
similar ARIMA model forecasts inflation better than the Livingston survey
measure, it appears as though the approach outlined here will outperform the
Livingston measure as well. Because the true expected inflation rate can
probably be characterized as rational, the better, and hence more rational,
"'e forecasting performance of the TI discussed here is an indication that it is
t
a more accurate expected inflation measure than the surveyor ARlMA alternatives.
"'e . In addition quantitative information on how accurate TIt ~s as a measure
of expected inflation can be calculated, while this is not the case for the
surveyor ARIMA measures.
"'e
The error in TIt is:
(17) "'e e ( . (; TIt - TI = I - £r ) - • - rr ) = -(r~ - rrt ) t ·t. t t t t
Since this error is just the negative of the estimated real rate error, its
variance is identical to that of the real rate error in (13) and the lower and
upper bound standard errors can be calculated with the formulae in (14) and
(15). These standard errors, especially the lower bound which is likely to
be more accurate, not only provide confidence intervals for the expected in-
flation rate, but also can be useful in determining how severe the errors-in-
variable bias would be when this expected inflation measure is used in other
empirical work.
Figure 3 plots the nominal interest rate along with the estimated real
rate from Figure 1 and its co~responding estimated expected inflation rate.
The most striking feature of this figure is the presence of the Fisher effect.
The correlation of the estimated expected inflation rate and the nominal
·interest rate is .95. Thus despite the finding here that the real rate is not
constant, the basic Fama (1975) position that tile Fisher effect is strong inAnnual
Rate
FIGURE 3











, ,'.' , '", f '~' J. .. ,\" • , '\:
"". 1..1' \ • 1 ,
,../1 .. I" \ ,,, 1 I ~ _ ,'1, .. , / ~ IJ'"if '. ...l , ,."':'...., r j' .,.. "...:''' /" it,.£ ~ i" ~: I
JI"-'" .... . \ ' ..... • 'I 1'\ To .. , .. ,., ,_, \.... f I, _. ._, ! '. V 'v \' • ~. ./-4 \0 I i \ \........ ,._.~,,,- t· ,-. ,_~J. ..\~t..'\ /' \ ~ { (
. _J • tN".J ....1 \ j , " .,. I , .-', . ~. , ..-' \ ~ ,. , ,.' .....- ' .., \.,: \! '.,
.93 . , i , , • , i , , , ii' , , , i , , , • i , , , '-I
.82
.91







, , , , , , , « I , I , , , , I , , t , I , - .0Z ' , , , , ,
S5 69 65 79 75
Estimated real rate from Model 2.3
Estimated expected inflation from Model 2.3
.._------- Nominal interest rate (3-month Treasury bill)21
the postwar period is supported. As would be expected from the significant
negative correlation of the ex post real 'rate and lagged inflation, the
negative correlation of the estimated expected inflation rate and the esti-
mated real rate is substantial, equaling -.86.
Probably the most important aspect of Figure 3 from the point of view
of policy analysis is the negative coxrelation (-.67) of movements in the
nominal interest rate and the estimated real rate. There is an important
moral for policymakers in this negative correlation. Many economists have
long warned that increases in nominal interest rates do not necessarily mean
that money is tight because movements in the real rate might not be highly
correlated with the nominal rate. Figure 3 indicates something even stronger.
It says that an increase in nominal interest rates is associated with a lower
real rate rather than the 'reverse. Thus when nominal rates are high, it is
more likely that we are in a period of "easy money" with low real rates than
the contrary as has frequently been assumed. Targeting on a nominal interest
rate can thus cause policy to err in the wrong direction. Therefore, it is
a highly dangerous policy approach, and it hopefully has been abandoned by the
Fed in the recent revision of its policy procedures in Octobe+ 1979.
RESULTS: 1931-4 to 1952-4
There are several problems with analysis of ex post real rates in the
pre-1953 period. Before the 1953 major revision of the CPI, this price index
was not measured that accurately. Particularly troublesome is the fact that
prices were often sampled infrequently in constructir.g the early CPI data,
and this could induce spurious correlations with the calculated ex post real
rates. Another problem is that for much of this period the nominal interest
rate was pegged. From 1937 through 1941 the t-bill rate dropped essentially22
to zero. Since there is an alternative, readily available asset in the economy
which has a zero nominal return--i.e., currency--the bill rate could not fall
further. Thus it was effectively pegged during this period. After this, up
until the early part of 1951, the bill rate was then actually pegged by the
Federal Reserve System. As Fama (1975) has noted, we might not expect Fisher
relationships to appear in data where.nominal interest rates are pegged.
We must therefore be cautious when we interpret results using these
earlier data. However, it is worthwhile studyin~ these results because they
might provide further evidence which corroborates the striking results obtained
from the postwar data found in Tables 1 and 2. The sample period analyzed
here starts in the fourth quarter of 1931 when t-bil1 data first become avail-
able in the CRSP bond file. Go1dfeld-Quandt (1965) and Glesjer (1969) tests
were again conducted to see if there was heteroscedasticity within the 1931-4
to 1952-4 sample period. No significant heteroscedasticity was found so
., . d d .th d' 1 35 est1mat10n aga1n procee e W1 or 1nary east squares.
Tables 4-5 correspond to Tables 1-2 and again test for the constancy
of the real rate, but now for the earlier sample period, 1931-4 to 1952-4.
As in the previous results, the ex post real rate from 1931-4 to 1952-4 does
display large positive autocorre1ations for the first four lags; whi.le the
autocorrelations at higher lags are not significantly different from zero.
The joint test for the significance of the first twelve autocorrelations in
Table 4 also corroborates the previous finding that the ex post real rate is
serially correlated. The Q(12) statistic is over 40 with a marginal signifi-
cance level less than .0001, indicating that the real rate was not constant
in the 1931-4 to 1952-4 sample period.
Model 5.1 of Table 5 tests for whether the negative relationship
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NOTES: See Table 1.·TABLE 5
Tests of the Constancy of the Real Rate: 1931-4 to 1952-3
Dependent Variable: Ex Post Real Rate
Estimation Method: Ordinary Least Squares
====================================================================================--=====
Coefficient of Marginal
Constant 2 R2 F- Signifiaance
Model # Term 1f(-1) Time Time SE OW Statistic Level
*
5.1 -.0021 -.4937 -6 .24- .0171 2.00 26.28 1.90 x 10
(-1.08) (-5.13)
5.2 .0239 -.1381 .1260 .20 .0176 1.25 10.40 9.43 x 10-5
(3.55) (-4.12) (3.55) I\J
I\J
0"
-.3696 - .0938 .0165 1.94 12.18 -6
5.3 .0161 .0886 .31 1.18 x 10
(2.42) (-3.56) (-2.78) (2.55)
NOTES: T-statistics in parentheses, R2, SE and OW, F and marginal significance level are as
defined in Table 2 with the F's distributed as F(1,83) for 5~l, F(2,82) for 5.2 and
F(3,81) for 5.3.
1f(-1) , Time and Time2 are as defined in Table 2, except that Time runs from .01 in
1931-3 to .88 in 1952-423
sample period. The answer is yes. The coefficient on lagged inflation is
again negative. and statistically significant: its value of -.4937 is even
larger than that f~und in the postwar data and its t-statistic is greater
than five in absolute value. Because the nominal bill rate was effectively
pegged after 1937, we might wonder if this negative relationship only occurs
as a result of the pegging in the later part of the sample period. To explore
this, the sample was split at the 1937-4 quarter, and model 5.1 was estimated
for the two periods. The coefficient on lagged inflation in the 1931-4 to
1937-4 sample period equals -.4265 and is statistically significant with a
t-statistic of -2.17. The coefficient on lagged inflation in the 1938-1 to
1952-4 sample period equals -.4654 with a t-statistic of -4.04. As would be
expected from these results, a Chow test which tests for the stability of the
coefficients in 5.1 over tre two sample periods cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficients are equal: F(2,8l) = 1.16 with the critical value of
F at 5% approximately equal to 3.1.
These results with the earlier sample period provide even more evidence
that Fama's (1975) finding that the real rate is constant and is not negatively
correlated with inflation is the exception and not the rule. The ex post real
rate is found to be significantly negatively correlated with inflation in
every sample period except Fama's, and it appears that this is not due to a
definite absence of the negative correlation in his sample period, but rather
to the lack of variation in the data. Indeed, not too surprisingly considering
the nature of the pre-1953 data, it appears as though the strong negative
association of real rates and inflation found in the postwar data is on the
weak side by historical standards. A Chow test, suitably corrected for hetero-
scedasticity,36 comparing the coefficients of 2.1 and 5.1 finds that the
coefficients are not stable over the 1931-79 sample period: the null hypothesis24
of equal coefficients is rejected at the one percent level with F(2,189) =
9.19, while th~ critical F at 1% is approximately 4.7.
Model 5.2 conducts the more mechanical test of the constancy of the
real rate, assuming that the real rate moves with a second-order polynomial
in time. A second-order polynomial is used here because additional variables
with time trends raised to a higher power did not add significant explanatory
power in both the 5.2 and 5.3 regressions.37 The null hypothesis that the
coefficients of the time trend variables equal zero is rejected with a low
marginal significance level. When the time trend variables are added to the
model with lagged infiation as an explanatory variable, as in 5.3, they do
contain significant, additional explanatory power: F(2,8l) = 4.13 with the
critical F at 5% equal to 3.1. The addition of these variables then leads to
an even lower marginal sig~ificance level for the null hypothesis implied by
the constancy of the real rate. These results again support the postwar
findings.
Figure 4 plots the estimate of the real interest rate derived from
the fitted values of 5.3. The upper and lower bound 95% confidence bands
are derived as for Figure I from the formulae in (14) and (15). One inter-
esting feature of this figure is the much greater variability of the estimated
real rate in this early sample period than in the later, postwar period. (~is
result is brought put more clearly in Fiqurc Al in Ap~endix I, which disnlay~ the
estimated real rate for both sample periods in one graph.) This might be an
indication of the greater economic stability in the later period.
Some economists have challenged the Keynesian position that money
was "easy" during the contractionary phase of the Great Depression by stating
that real interest rates were probably quite high during this period although
nominal interest rates were low.38 This view is given strong support in Figure 4.
The estimated real rates from 1931-4 to 1933-1 range from .6.2% to 10.2% at
an annual rate. Using the lower bound standard e.r:rors, not only are theAnnual Quarterly
?ate Rate
FIGURE 4
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estimated real rates significantly higher than zero--sometimes by over four
standard errorp--but they also appear to be significantly higher than any
of the estimated ;eal rates for the postwar period. By the criterion of
real rates, the evidence indicates that since 1931 money has never been
tighter than in the contraction phase of the Great Depression.
The estimated real rate begins to decline as the economy recovers after
1933-2 and bounces around zero until 1938-2. From then on until 1952-4, the
estimated real rate is almost always negative and is significantly so (by
the criterion of the lower-bound standard errors) for rr~st of this period.
Indeed the estimated ~eal rate is frequently less ~~an -5% and reaches its
low point of -16.4% in 1946-4 when it is five of the lower bound standard
errors away from zero. Thus the period where nominal interest rates were
pegged, also appears to haye been a period of negative real rates.
Figure 5 contains the estimated real rates derived from the model with
only lagged inflation as an explanatory variable versus those from the model
which also includes the time trends as explanatory variables. Because the
trend variables do significantly help to explain the ex post real rate, as
discussed before, they can provide information on what effect left-out
economic variables might be having on the real rate. The comparison of the
two estimated real rate series in Figure 5 indicates that the left-out
variables make the real rate higher in the 1931-37 period and lower thereafter.
Figure 6, which plots the estimated real interest rate from 5.3, its
corresponding estimated expected inflation and the nominal interest rate for
the 1931-52 period, is comparable to Figure 3. Here we see some striking
differences between the earlier and later sample periods. We again see the
negative correlation of eXPected inflation and real rates as we might expect,
although it is even stronger than before, equaling -.99. However, we noFIGURE 5
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longer find any evidence of the Fisher effect that was so visible in the post-
war period. T,Pe correlation of expected inflation and the nominal interest
rates is not even positive in this early sample period: it is quite small
and is slightly negative, equaling -.13. None of these results is particularly
surprising because as Figure 6 illustrates, there was very little movement
in nominal interest rates in this period. With substantial variation in the
expected inflation rate, this must necessarily result in a very strong negative
correlation of the real rate and expected inflation and the absence of a
Fisher effect.
• Figure 6 does support the important policy-oriented conclusion of
Figure 3. Movements in nominal interest rates contain little information
about the movements in real interest rates. In this early sample period, the
correlation of the nominal with the real interest rate is only .25. It was
just as easy for the monetary authorities in the pre-1953 period to confuse
tight versus easy monetary policy as a result of focusing on nominal rather
than real interest rates, as it was during the more recent period. The policy
mistakes of the Fed during the contraction phase of the Great Depression
clearly attest to this fact.
RESULTS: TAX EFFECTS ON THE REAL RATE
So far, the consequences of taxes on nominal interest payments have
been "ignored. As has been emphasized by Darby (1975) and especially Feldstein
(1976, 1980a,b) this can be misleading for the postwar period. Clearly, what
is relevant to the firm's decision to invest or the consumer's decision to
save versus consume is the real after-tax interest rate. However, as has
been illustrated by Feldstein and Summers (1978) and Shiller (1980), the
effective tax rate on interest payment~canvary tremendously for differentThere is no claim
27
individuals and firms, particularly when they are making different types of
decisions. It,is easy to find cases where the effective tax rate on interes~
payments ranges from zero on up to the top"marginal tax rate. As a result,
it is extremely difficult to know what is the appropriate tax rate on interest
payments for the overall economy. This is the primary reason why the analysis
in this paper focuses first on real interest rates ignoring the effect of
taxes.
To get a flavor of how taxes might affect the previous results, the
empirical analysis in Tables 1-3 has been redone with an after-tax ex post
real rate which has b~en calculated under the assumption that the effective
marginal tax rate is a third. This tax rate was chosen because it is approxi-
mately in the middle of the range of several authors' estimates of the marginal
f . . th . d 39 tax rate or 1nterest payments 1n e postwar per10 •
here that this tax rate is an accurate estimate of the effective tax rate on
interest, but the results using it will provide us with a reasonable idea of
how important tax effects might be to some of the conclusions reached earlier.
Tables 6-8 contain the estimated results using the after-tax ex post
real rate. Because only a crude adjustment has been made here for taxes, these
results do not deserve a detailed discussion. A few brief comments should be
sufficient to give us a flavor of how tax effects would affect our views. The
tests for the constancy of the after-tax real rate in Tables 6 and 7 reject
the null hypothesis at even lower marginal significance levels than in Tables
I-and 2. Adjusting the. ex post real rate for taxes increases the variation
in this variable and this is what leads to the even stronger positive serial
correlation found in Table 6 and the stronger rejections of the constancy of
the after-tax real rate. Because the tax adjustment forces the after-tax real
rate to decline as the nominal interest rate rises along with the inflationTABLE 6
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After-tax ex post real rate calculated with tax rate of .33.TABLE 7
Tests of the Constancy of the After-Tax Real Rate: 1953-1 to 1979-4
Dependent Variable: Ex Post Real Rate, Adjusted for .33 Marginal Tax Rate
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TABLE 8
~ Tests for Correlation of After-Tax Real Rate with Other Variables: 1953-1 to 1979-4
.
Dependent Variable: Ex Post Real Rate, Adjusted for .33
Marginal Tax Rate
Estimation Method: Ordinary Least Squares
========================================================================- ===========================
Coefficient of F-test for significant
explanatory power of
Independent four lags of independent
Independent Constant Variable
R2 variable when included
Model # Variable Term 1T(-1) Lagged Once SE DW in this model
8.1 money -.0001 -.2321 .09 .0058 .99 7.29
growth (Ml) (-.15) (-3.30)
8.2 money .0025 -.4569 -.0605 .46 .0046 2.37 1.20
growth (Ml) (3.21) (-8.47) (-1.04)
8.3 real GNP -.0032 .0875 .02 .0061 .90 1.44
growth (-4.30) (1.55)
8.4 real GNP .0022 -.4822 -.0178 .46 .0046 2.40 1.08
growth (2.75) (-9.16) (-.41)
8.5 GNP gap -.0024 -.0001 .00 .0062 .82 .70
(-3.41) (-.00)
8.6 GNP gap .0019 -.4778 .0078 .46 .0046 2.40 .77
(2.66) (-9.40) (.48)
8.7 unemploy- .0013 -.0719 .02 .0061 .86 1.10
ment rate (.55) (-1.65)
8.8 unemploy- .0025 -.4733 -.0103 .46 .0046 2.39 .26
ment rate (1.42) (-9.13) (-.31)
8.9 investment .0046 -.0722 .01 .0062 .82 .82
to capital (.54) (-.84)
ratio
8.10 investment .0075 -.4754 -.0564 .46 .0046 2.41 .27
to capital (1.20) (-9.39) (-.88)
ratio
NOTES: See Table 3.28
rate, the coefficient on lagged inflation becomes even more negative and
statistically. significant. Tax adjustment of the ex post real rate thus
generates conclusions similar to and even stronger than those found when it
was not adjusted. Clearly, use of a different tax rate would not alter the
direction of these results.
Table 8 shows that the conclusions on the correlation of real rates
with other variables do not change when a tax adjustment is made. Feldstein
(1980a) makes the case that monetary policy will be non-neutral, because even
if it leaves the unadjusted real rate unchanged when it causes higher inflation,
the after-tax real rate will fall. The results in Table 3 indicate that, even
without a tax adjustment, the real rate has fallen with faster money growth.
However, as the 8.r and 8.2 results show, when the real rate is adjusted for
taxes, this negative corr~lationis even stronger.
The estimated after-tax real rate derived from the fitted values of
7.3 along with its upper and lower bound 95% confidence intervals is plotted
in Figure 7. In the first half of the 1953-79 period, the after-tax real
rates appear to be mostly positive, yet even the lower bound confidence
interval rarely rejects the hypothesis that the after-tax real rate is zero.
In the late 1960s the estimated after-tax real rate turns negative and from
1969 through the end of the sample period it is significantly negative
using the lower-bound standard errors. Note that towards the end of the
period, even the upper-bound standard errors indicate that it is significantly
negative. In the 1970s, the estimated after-tax real rate is frequently
below -4% at an annual rate and is more than six of the lower-bound standard
errors away from zero.J.,nnua1
?..ate
FIGURE 7
Estimated After-Tax Real Rate with 95% Confidence Intervals: 1953-1 to 1979-4
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Figures 8 and 9 which correspond to 2 and 3 are included in the paper
for the sake of completeness. They reveai no surprises. As is evident from
Figure 8, the time trend variables play a similar role in altering the esti-
mate of the after-tax real rate that they do for the estimate of the real
rate unadjusted for taxes. Furthermore, the estimate of expected inflation
and its relationship to the nominal interest rate in Figure 9 is similar to
that found in Figure 3.40 Figure 9 does illustrate the expected finding that
the correlations of the estimated after-tax real rate with the estimates of
expected inflation and the nominal interest rate are even more negative--the
respective correlations equal -.96 and -.80--than is the case when the real
rate is unadjusted for taxes. The conclusion that the nominal interest rate
is a misleading guide to the tightness of monetary policy is then given even
greater support when we view the after-tax real rate as the vehicle through
which monetary policy is transmitted.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the movements of real interest rates over
the 1931-79 period with a statistical methodology that has the advantage of
reliability. Despite the low statistical power of the approach used here,
many interesting findings have been gleaned from the data. These findings
are listed below.
1. The hypothesis that the real rate is constant is strongly
rejected both for the 1953-79 period as well as the 1931-52
period. Fama's (1975) finding that the constancy of the
real rate could not be rejected-is the exception and not the30
rule. His result seems to stem from the lack of variation in
the real rate for his sample period. The adjustment of the real
.
rate for taxes lends even stronger support to the position that
the after-tax real rate, which is probably more relevant to
economic decisions, is not constant.
2. The real rate, whether ad~usted or unadjusted for taxes, is
negatively correlated with inflation. This result is found
for both the 1953-79 and 1931-52 sample period, and again Fama's
(1975) failure to find this result appears to be due to a lack
• of variation in the real rate data.
3. Movements in real variables are not significantly
correlated with ex post real rates, whether adjusted or un-
adjusted for t~xes. The failure to find these correlations is
more likely the result of small cyclical variation of real rates
rather than the absence of relationships between real variables
and real rates.
4. Increased money growth is associated with a decline in real rates.
This non-neutrality result is even stronger when the real rate
is adjusted for taxes. Little evidence was found that money
growth affects real rates other than through its effect on in-
flation, but again this could be due to the low power of the
statistical tests used here.
5. The real interest rate appears to have been positive in the
1950s and 1960s but has since turned negative in the rnid- and
late 1970s. When the real rate is adjusted for taxes, there is
less evidence that it has been positive in the postwar period
and there is strong evidence that it has been negative since 1969.31
6. Real rates were extremely high during the contraction phase of
the Great Depression and have never been as high since. From
the perspective of real interest rates, money has never been
tighter than during this period.
7. The period where nominal interest rates were effectively pegged
from 1938-1951 has been ~ period where real interest rates have
been negative.
8. Estimates of expected inflation rates have been derived from
models of the real rate, and these estimates have several
advantages over those obtained from surveys or Box-Jenkins'
ARlMA models. The estimates of expected inflation confirms
Fama's (1975) view that in the postwar period there is a strong
Fisher effect-where expected inflation and nominal interest
rates move together. However, no Fisher effect is evident in
the pre-1953 sample period.
9. Movements in nominal interest rates are not a reliable indicator
of movements in real rates, whether adjusted for taxes or not.
This is true of both the 1931-52 and 1953-79 sample period.
The correlation of estimated real rates and nominal interest
rates is low in the 1931-52 sample period and is even negative
in the postwar period.
The most important policy implication from these results is the re-
commendation that policymakers, politicians and the public should not focus
on nominal interest rates as an indicator of the tightness of monetary policy.
Not only do the results here indicate that nominal interest rates contain little
information on real interest rates and hence on the tightness of monetary policy,
but they also indicate that nominal interest rates have been a highly misleading32
indicator of monetary tightness during some crucial business cycle episodes.
For example, :t:eal interest rates appear t'o have been extremely high during .
the Great Depression downturn, and yet, by the criterion of low nominal interest
rates, this period appears to have been one of "easy money" rather than the
reverse. Knowledge of the true state of monetary tightness might have led the
Fed to take more appropriate policy a~tions. Similarly, the period of the
1970s appeared to be one of "tight money" by the nominal interest rate
criterion, yet real rates appear to have been quite low. Knowledge of ~ow
"easy" money truly was might have encouraged a less expansionary monetary
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Estimated ex ante real rate from Figures 1 and 4.





VARIABLES AND .SOURCES OF DATA
W t = inflation rate (at quarterly rate) = log(CPlt/CPlt _l ) 0
CPlt = seasonally unadjusted consumer price index for the last month of
quarter t: postwar data obtained from the Survey of Current Business
and Business Statistics; prewar data obtained from the BLS.
i . = the nominal return (at a quarterly rate) over the quarter of a 3-month
t
treasury bill maturing at the end of the quarter = log(IOO/PBt ).
PB
t = the average of "the bid and asked price at the beginning of the quarter
for the 3-month bill maturing at the end of quarter t: obtained
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) bond file.
eprr
t = the ex post real rate for the 3-month bill maturing at the end of
quarter t = i - 'If t t·
the log of MI for the last month of quarter t minus money growth (MI) t =
the log of MI for the last month of quarter t-l: data obtained
from Business Statistics and the Survey of Current Business.
real GNP growth
t = the log of real GNP for quarter t (GNPt ) minus the log of
real GNP for quarter t-l: data obtained from Business Statistics and






is potential GNP for quarter t, estimated
by the Council of Economic Advisors and obtained from them.
unemployment rate
t = the unemployment rate for the last month of the
quarter t: obtained from Business Statistics and the Survey of
current Business.34
investment to capital ratiot = expenditures on housing and business fixed
investment in plant and durable equipment in quarter t, divided by
the stock of residential, plant and durable equipment capital at the
end of the ql,1arter t: data obtained from the (MPS) Quarterly
Econometric Model data bank at the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve.F-l
FOOTNOTES
1For example, see Modigliani (1974).
2See Mayer (1978) and Meltzer (1976).
3Howrey and Hymans (1978), Boskin (1978), and Summers (1978).
4Recent empirical results on this issue are quite mixed. For example,
Boskin's (1978) study has been strongly challenged by Howrey and Hymans
(1978).
SAll returns, inflation and interest rates discussed in this paper
are continuously compounded, so L~at additional second-order terms are not
necessary in the Fisher equation (1).
6For example, see Gibson (1972), Cargill (1976), Lahiri (1976),
carlson (1977), Levi and Makin (1979) and Tanzi (1980).
70ne obvious danger with survey data is that there may have been
very little incentive for the respondents to answer accurately. A more
subtle point that is often unrecognized in the literature is that the be-
havior of market expectations need not reflect the average expectations of
participants in that market. Market expectations are frequently believed to
be rational, but not because all, most or even the average market participant
is also believed to be rational. Rather, rational expectations are plausible
because market expectations can be driven to the rational expectations equili-
brium by the elimination of unexploited profit opportunities. This arbitrage
view of expectations formation clearly allows the average expectations of
market participants to differ from the market's expectations. (Mishkin (1978)
and (198lb) discuss this point more extensively.) On theoretical grounds
alone then, we should be skeptical of using survey data to measure inflationF-2
expectations in a market.
In addition, a recent empirical study by Pearce (1979) raises further
doubts abo~t·the accuracy as a measure of bond market expectations of the
survey data most frequently used in this literature, Livingston's. Pearce
finds that over the 1959-76 period the Livingston survey data predict inflation
substantially worse than a simple (O!l,l) ARIMA model estimated only on data
available at the time of the forecast. As Pearce notes, this result implies
that the Livingston expectations data do not fully exploit information on past
inflation rates and are thus inconsistent with rationdlity. If the bond mar-
•
ket is believed to be efficient and hence rational--and there is evidence to
support this view--then Pearce's finding suggests that the Livingston data do
not accurately measure bond market expectations of inflation. For example,
using the sample period c~osest to Pearce's 1959-2 to 1976-4, I conducted the
same test found in Mishkin (1981b) for the rationality of inflation expectations
in the bond market and could not reject rationality. The X2(6) statistic
was 3.4, while its critical level at 5% is 12.6. Pearce also regresses
nominal interest rates on both the Livingston measure of inflation expectations
as well as the ARIMA model measure. Not only is the Livingston measure out-
performed by the ARlMA measure in terms of goodness of fit, but also the
Livingston measure adds no significant additional explanatory power when
added to a Fisher equation using the ARlMAmeasure, while the reverse is not
true. Given that a strong Fisher effect (positive correlation) between
expected inflation and nominal interest rates is expected in the postwar
period, this evidence is also not supportive of using the Livingston data in
the Fisher equation (1).
8see Fama (1970).
9see Mishkin (198lb).F-3
10 . X'u For example, an assumption like p11m --- = 0, where n is the number n
of observations, performs a similar role in the stochastic X case as the
assumption that E(u) = 0 (or equivalently E(Xlu) = 0) performs in the non-
stochastic X case.
III l' XIX • t .e., p 1m --- eX1s s.
n
12An even stronger statement can be made if a particular form of
Muthian expectations discussed by Sargent (1979, Chapter 10) is used to form
the ex ante real rate. If the ex ante real rate is formed by least-squares
projection on information that includes Xt _
l
, then X'E = 0 and the OLS estimate
of e from (4) will exactly equal that in (5), even in finite samples. This
is a manifestation of the law of iterated projections discussed in Sargent
(1979, Chapter 10).
13Cumby, Huizinga and Obstfeld (1980) point out that in a setup of
the type discussed here that even if the u's are serially uncorrelated as are
the E'S because of rationality, this does not rule out serial correlation in
the composite error term u - E. This occurs because rationality does not
rule out correlation of the forecast errors with future values of variables
such as u. This is why the fifth assumption in (8) is needed. If serial
correlation does exist in the composite error term, correcting it with standard
techniques leads to inconsistent estimates. For example, see Flood and Garber
(1980). An estimator that avoids this problem is discussed in Curoby, Huizinga
and Obstfeld (1980).
14A similar argument to that here is another way to explain the
position taken by Fama (1976a) and Mishkin (1978) that when actual returns
have large variability relative to expected returns, accurate specification
of the model of market equilibrium is not critical to tests of market
efficiency.F-4
l5Note that this formula is not invalidated if E(X'u) ~ 0 as long as
u is a linear function of X. I.e., if u = Xo + n where n is also a linear
function of X and so on, then E(r~t - rr
t
) = O. Thus consistency of thee
estimate is not a necessary condition for the validity of the 95% confidence
intervals used in the figures. However, exclusion of relevant variables can
invalidate the formula.
l6The variance of a post sample error would be (02 + 02)X (X'X)-lX' + 02
€ u t-l t-l u
which is larger than the within-sample variance in (13). This occurs because
the term E(Ut(U - €) 'l equals zero in this case. Because the real rate estimates
later in the text are all within sample, the within-sample variance, rather
than the post sample variance, is discussed in the text.
l7If we denot~ X (X'X)-lX' "2 "2
then the estimated = Q and a = ao t-l , t-l u
"
" "2 "2 "2 dVAR(r'l:t) "2 VAR(r'rt ) = [(1 - a)o - ao ]Q + ao . = a [1 - 2Q] > 0 if Q < 1/2. da
Thus the lower bound estimate is reached when a=O and the upper bound estimate
when a=l.
laThe data used here are very similar to that used by Fama (1975).
Using his sample period I was able to reproduce very closely his results with
quarterly data.
19For example, excluding the 1971-3 to 1974-4 quarters from the 1953-79
sample period, the coefficient on ~(-l) in model 1.2 dropped to -.2469 but
remained significantly negative with a t-statistic of -4.41. A Chow test
of the 2.1 model splitting the 1953-79 sample period into its price control
and non-price control periods did not reveal significant changes in the
parameter estimates. F(2,104) = 2.36 while the critical F at 5% is approxi-
mately 3.1.F-5
20see Fama (1970).
2lFor example, see the discussion of the Shiller (1979) results in
Mishkin (1978) and (198la).
22For example, in model 2.1 a Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) test which
excluded 16 observations yielded the F(44,44) statistic of 1.51, while the
critical F at the 5% level is approximately 1.7. A Glesjer (1969) test
where the absolute value of the residuals in 2.1 was regressed against a
time trend yielded a t-statistic on the trend variable of only .94. I also
regressed the absolute value of the residuals from the Table 2 model against
lagged inflation because some recent literature has suggested that the
variability of inflation forecasting errors, £'s, might rise with inflation.
The evidence for this was weak. For example, with the 2.1 residuals the
t-statistic on lagged inflation was only .72. Furthermore, a heteroscedasticity
correction of the type suggested by Glesjer (1969)--i.e., weighting by the
fitted values from this regression--has only a slight effect on the results.
23A proxy for the expected inflation rate derived from an ARlMA (0,1,1)
inflation model with a seasonal MAl term was also used in estimation and the
results were very similar. For example, in a model of the form 2.1 when the
expected inflation proxy replaced the lagged inflation rate, its coefficient
was -.3658 with a t-statistic of -7.03. I preferred not using this proxy
vari~le in the text because the results there clearly indicate that other
information besides past inflation rates are used in the bond market to
forecast inflation.
24For exanq;>le, the null hypothesis that when added to model 2.2, the
coeff~cients on four additional powers of time, up to the eighth power, equal
zero could not be rejected. F(4,99) = .95 while the critical F at 5% is
approximately 2.5.F-6
250ne issue not discussed in the text is the seasonality of the real
rate. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Fama and Schwert (1979)
and Shiller (1980). I corroborated both of these studies' findings that
seasonality is present in the ex post real rate. For example, a test of
whether seasonal dummies entered model 2.1 did reject the null hypothesis
that coefficients and seasonal dummies equal zero--(F(3,103) = 5.93 with a
critical value at 5% of 2.7)--yet the results on the coefficient of lagged
inflation changed hardly at all. The coefficient on lagged inflation was
estimated to be -.3170 with a t-statistic of -6~67. However 8 more time is not
spent on this issue here for two reasons. One is t~at an extensive treatment
of this issue is contained in the two studies mentioned above. Second, as the
discussion in Famaand Schwert (1979) indicates, the fact that seasonality
exists in the real rate is not evidence against the constancy of the real
rate net of storage costs, and this is the more interesting hypothesis any-
way. In addition, the fixed-weight nature of the CPI may induce some
seasonality in the measured ex post real rate that is spurious. When the
relative price of a good in the CPI consumption bundle is seasonally high--
fruit during the winter is an example--we expect that there will be sub-
stitution away from this good. Thus the seasonality in the true price index
should be less than in the measured fixed-weight index. In the data here,
the seasonality in ex post real rates comes predominantly from the price
index. Hence, the seasonality of the measured ex post real rate constructed
using the fixed-weight index will be overstated.
26 . d . I d . . An ~n ustr~a pro uct~on growth var~able as well as other variations
of the investment-to-capital-ratio variable suggested by Fama and Gibbons
(1980), including one using a new order series for durable goods, were also
tested as in Table 3. Again, no significant correlations were found with
Ule ex post real rate.F-7
27Fama (1976b) has suggested that the variability of inflation fore-
cast errors (as me,;.asured by the variability of the ex post real rate), as
well as the variability of expected inflation (as measured by the variability
of the change in nominal t-bill rates), might affect risk premiums and hence
real rates. Experiments with variables similar to Fama's (1976b) did indicate
that the variability of these variabl~s was significantly negatively cor-
related with ex post real rates. However when lagged inflation was also
included in these regressions, the coefficients of these variables no longer
remained significant.
Fama and Gibbons (1980) suggest that expectations of higher returns
on investments and hence the investment-capital ratio will be positively
correlated with real rates. As Table 3 indicates, experiments with the
investment-capital ratio did not yield significant correlations. The failure
of this variable could have resulted because it is too loosely correlated
with expectations of investment opportunities. One crude variable that
might reflect these expectations would be the real value of the Standard
and Poor's index of stock prices which measures one component of the valuation
of firms. Results with this variable were somewhat, but not strongly,
encouraging. One lag of this variable was almost, but not quite, signifi-
cantly correlated with ex post real rates (t = 1.95) and had the expected
positive sign. Four lags were significant in a regression that excluded
lagged inflation: F(4,103) = 3.23, while the critical value at 5% is
approximately 2.5. In regressions with lagged inflation included, one lag
of this variable was again almost significant (t = 1.95) and four lags were
not significant (F(4,102) = 1.97). The results are encouraging enough so
that further work on this issue might be worthwhile.
28When M2 money growth replaces the M1 measure in 3.1, the coefficient
on the M2 growth variable lagged only once is -.1475 wilh a t-statistic of
-2.65, and the F-statistic on the four lags is 2.89 with the sum of theF-8
coefficients equal to -.2155. In the 3.2 result, the coefficient on M2
growth lagged pnce is -.0571 with a t-statistic of -1.11 and the F-statistic
.
on the four lags is .66.
29In the regression with four lags of the Ml money growth variable,
the sum of the Ml money growth coefficients is -.2781.
30Seasonally unadjusted Ml and"M2 data were also used in the 3.1 and
3.2 regressions. In 3.1, the coefficient on the money' growth variable
lagged only once is insignificantly positive, but the fuur lagged money
growth variables do h~ve significant explanatory power: for Ml F(4,103) =
5.40 and for M2, F(4,103) = 3.35. Furthermore, the sum of their coefficients
is again negative: -.2626 for Ml and -.1276 for M2. In 3.2, the coefficient
on Ml lagged only once is significantly positive for Ml--it is .0367 with
a t-statistic of 2.26--while the coefficient on M2 lagged only once is
positive and insignificant. The four lagged M2 variables again do not
have significant additional explanatory power--F(4,102) = 1.87 with the
critical F at 5% equal to 2.5--yet the four lagged Ml variables do--F(4,102) =
3.85. However, there is no easily discernible pattern to these coefficients
which are both positive and negative and sum to -.0240. This result is
intriguing and should be pursued further. Overall then, the evidence with
seasonally unadjusted Ml and M2 data is more mixed, although it does continue
to s~pport the suggest~on that increased money growth is non-neutral because
it lowers the real rate by raising inflation.
31Garbade and Wachtel (1978) report the standard error of their
estimate at as the standard error of the estimated real rate. Hence this
standard error is also a lower-bound estimate because implicitly they are
assuming that a = O. Their standard errors are also similar in magnitude
u
to the lower-bound standard errors of Figure 1.F-9
32Th . l' d . d'th . h e no~na 1nterest rate a Juste W1 a constant 1S one suc
estimate, if, 'as in Fama (1975), the real rate is assumed to be constant.
33This ARIMA model was identified with the Box-Jenkins (1970) pro-
cedure and was subjected to the usual diagnostic checks and found to be
adequate. Pearce (1979) also specifies inflation as an ARlMA (0,1,1) but
does not need to specify any seasonal terms since he worked with seasonally
adjusted data rather than unadjusted data as here.
34If seasonal dummies are added to model 2.3, the standard error of
A e the 1ft estimate drops' even further to .0039. Thus this comparison becomes
Ae even more favorable to the 1f
t
estimate.
35For example, in model 5.1, a Goldfeld-Quandt test which excluded
seventeen observations yielded the F(32,32) statistic of 1.21 while the
critical F at 5% is approximately 1.8. A Glesjer test where the absolute
value of the residuals in 5.1 was regressed against a time trend variable
yielded a t-statistic on the trend variable of -1.66. A similar test when
the absolute value of the residuals was regressed on lagged inflation
yielded a t-statistic on the lagged inflation coefficient of -.58.
36A comparison of the standard error of 2.1 and 5.1 indicates that
the variance of the error term is over fourteen times higher in the pre-1953
than in the 1953-79 sample period. This is a very significant rejection of
the null hypothesis that there is homoscedasticity: F(83,106) = 14.43 with
the critical F at 1% approximately equal to 1.7. The Chow test mentioned
above used weighted least squares in estimation where the data for the
1931-52 observations were weighted by the standard error of 5.1 and the
1953-79 observations by the standard error of 2.1.F-10
37In the 5.2 model three additional trend variables raised to the
third, fourth 'and fifth power did add significant explanatory power:
F(3,79) = 3.03 with the critical F at 5% equal to 2.7. However, in the
5.3 model these variables did not add significant explanatory power:
F(3,78) = 1.74 with the critical F at 5% equal to 2.7. In any case, the
same conclusions were reached using either the second-order or the fifth-
order polynomial in the above analysis.
38For example, Meltzer (1976) and Mayer (1979).
39For examp1e,'Wright (1969), Darby (1975) ~nd Tanzi (1980). Note
that Levi and Makin (1978) also use this tax rate on interest payments for
illustrative purposes.
40ance lagged inf1~tion, which is highly correlated with the lagged
nominal interest rate, is included as an explanatory variable in a real
rate regression, the results for additional explanatory variables are
expected to be very similar, regardless of whether the real rate is adjusted
or unadjusted for taxes. To see this, just realize that if the lagged
nominal interest rate were an explanatory variable, then a regression with
the after-tax real rate as the dependent variable is just a linear trans-
formation of the regression with the unadjusted real rate as the dependent
variable. In this case the results on additional explanatory variables
would be identical in either regression. They should therefore be quite
similar if the lagged nominal interest rate is replaced by the lagged
inflation rate. This same point explains why the estimates of expected
inflation from the after-tax versus unadjusted real rate models 2.3 and 7.3
should also be so similar.R.l
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